India in 2009: Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival by Sharma, Shalendra
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Politics College of Arts and Sciences
2010
India in 2009: Global Financial Crisis and Congress
Revival
Shalendra Sharma
University of San Francisco, sharmas@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/pols
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Politics by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shalendra Sharma. India in 2009: Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival. Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 1 ( January/February
2010), pp. 139-156
Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 1, pp. 139–156. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2010 
by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-
sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights 
and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2010.50.1.139.
139
SHALENDRA SHARMA
India in 2009
Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival
ABSTRACT
The past year was a momentous one for India. The country navigated through the 
shoals of an unprecedented global financial crisis with only modest negative impact, 
and successfully continued the world’s largest exercise in democracy. The 15th gen-
eral election in April-May 2009 saw the venerable Congress Party return to power 
with a large mandate. On the external front, although ties between India and the 
Obama administration have been friendly, real concerns remain about the future 
trajectory of Indo-U.S. relations. Relations with Pakistan and China also remain testy.
KEYWORDS:  Congress Party, global financial crisis, Lok Sabha elections, U.S.-India 
relations, economic globalization
FIFTEENTH GENERAL LOK SABHA  ELECTIONS
Between April 16 and May 13, 2009, India held its 15th general election since 
independence in 1947. Over 4,500 candidates representing nearly 300 politi-
cal parties, including numerous independent candidates, fiercely contested 
for the 545-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House, the lower house of Parliament). 
The elections took place in five phases between April and May in order to 
accommodate the estimated 714 million registered voters and minimize the 
logistical disruptions inevitable in the grueling five-week-long exercise. The 
800,000 polling stations—complete with 1,368,430 simple and “tamper-
proof” electronic voting machines, and backed by roughly 6.5 million elec-
tion workers including a large number of police and security forces—stood 
ready to ensure full and fair participation of the electorate. Despite the mas-
sive scale of the enterprise, the elections were held with minimal disruption 
and with an average voter turnout of about 60%.
Shalendra Sharma is Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of 
China and India in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Email: <sharmas@
usfca.edu>.
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On May 18, the Election Commission announced the results. Of the 420 
million people who voted, roughly 119 million marked their ballot next to 
the picture of an open hand, the symbol of the Indian National Congress 
(INC or Congress Party), which thus won 206 of the 545 Lok Sabha seats. 
This was not only a remarkable gain from the 145 seats it won in the 2004 
general election but also the closest thing to a mandate any party can realisti-
cally hope for in a fractious and deeply divided polity like India. The Con-
gress, together with its United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition partners, 
won 262 seats—10 shy of the halfway mark of 272 seats needed for a major-
ity. On the other hand, the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian 
People’s Party, BJP), the Congress’s main rival, won just 116 seats—a sharp 
drop from the 138 it won in 2004. In total, the BJP and its allies in the Na-
tional Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 159 seats, while the so-called Third 
Front—a hastily cobbled alliance of communist, regional, and caste-based 
parties—won just 80 seats. The Third Front, widely projected to win at least 
120 seats and be a “kingmaker” with immense bargaining power, actually 
proved to be the big loser in these elections.
Assured of the support of more than 300 Lok Sabha members, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh was sworn in for a second five-year term on May 
22. This marked a watershed of sorts because Singh is only the second prime 
minister after Jawaharlal Nehru (India’s first prime minister) to be elected for 
a second full term. Rank-and-file Congress members were disappointed that 
the party’s general secretary, Rahul Gandhi (the fourth generation member 
of the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty and widely seen as the architect of the Con-
gress’s resurgence), refused to accept a ministerial berth. But the party faithful 
may not have to wait long because the 38-year-old is the party’s heir apparent. 
Rahul’s selfless, but carefully choreographed, act of renunciation added to his 
growing political capital.
Nonetheless, the Congress’s coronation was not smooth sailing. Even as 
Singh was being sworn in, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian 
Progress Federation, DMK)—the Congress’s major ally with 18 seats from 
the state of Tamil Nadu—announced its refusal to join the cabinet because 
of differences over how ministerial positions were being allocated. DMK 
chief M. Karunanidhi eventually joined the government a few days later, but 
only after securing three coveted cabinet seats, including one for his son, 
Muthuvel Karunanidhi Azhagiri, and four ministers of state berths. This 
unabashed quid pro quo was a cautionary reminder that the Congress is still 
66 seats shy of a parliamentary majority to govern on its own.
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WHY THE CONGRESS WON
The Congress Party’s margin of victory came as a big surprise to most observ-
ers. For weeks, polls and pundits had predicted that neither of the two main 
parties would emerge a clear winner. Perhaps this explains why the Congress 
faithful celebrated so wildly in the sizzling 41 degrees Celsius (106 degrees 
Fahrenheit) heat to chants of “Jai Ho” (Victory Has Come), the party’s vic-
tory slogan taken from the Oscar-winning film Slumdog Millionaire. Court-
iers and senior Congress politicians paid the requisite darshan (homage) to 
the official residence of party president Sonia Gandhi, bearing giant bou-
quets. As the dust from the elections settled, it became apparent that the role 
played by Sonia and especially Rahul contributed significantly to the party’s 
success. It seems that the adulation (and nostalgia) the Indian public has for 
the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty has quite possibly been passed on to Rahul.
The month-long campaign seemed to have marked the triumphant arrival 
of Rahul Gandhi to the national political scene. Rahul is the son of former 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, grandson of former Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi, and Nehru’s great-grandson. Rahul served as a key strategist during 
the campaign and was also the party’s most energetic campaigner, traveling 
the length and breadth of the country to speak at an average of four rallies a 
day.1 Beyond his hectic schedule, Rahul also made a number of risky political 
gambles that, in hindsight, paid off handsomely. For example, he forced the 
party to deny a place on the ballot to tainted candidates and incumbents 
(both those with criminal records and those with corruption or criminal 
cases pending). Rahul insisted that the Congress field younger and better 
educated candidates. Above all, he listened to the party rank-and-file, which 
advised him not to form alliances with regional and caste-based political 
parties.
Clearly, the Congress’s decision to only have “seat-sharing” adjustments at 
the state level, instead of forming a national-level alliance, proved prescient. 
The Congress’s refusal to cede votes in its strongholds to its “allies” not only 
gave it more space for post-electoral negotiations but also greater leeway in 
eventually forming the government. With the election results as vindication, 
Rahul, who had been dismissed as a novice only a few weeks earlier, emerged 
as a political force to be reckoned with and has already been dubbed as the 
1. Amelia Gentleman, “Indian Voters Back Congress to Push through Reforms,” The Guardian 
(London), May 17, 2009; and Vidya Subramaniam, “The Coming of Age of Rahul,” The Hindu 
(Chennai), May 17, 2009.
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“prime-minister in waiting” by many in the press and political circles. Argu-
ably, the Indian public’s affection for the Gandhi-Nehru family is not re-
stricted to Rahul but also extended to his estranged cousin, Varun Gandhi 
(son of Rajiv’s younger brother Sanjay and the BJP’s new star), who also won 
by a landslide despite being jailed during the campaign (and then released 
on bail) for making vitriolic anti-Muslim statements.
If Rahul and Sonia Gandhi bring pedigree and celebrity status, Manmohan 
Singh, the mild-mannered Oxford-educated economist who has been prime 
minister since 2004, brings a refreshing sense of propriety and integrity to 
the highest office in the land. Although lacking an independent political base 
of his own and wholly beholden to Sonia Gandhi, Singh, for all his awk-
wardness, brings a quality that no Indian politician, including the Gandhis, 
can match. He is by all accounts honest and self-effacing, a man who has 
never succumbed to the allurements of power despite a senior-level govern-
mental career spanning more than three decades. Considering India’s corrup-
tion-ridden polity, not to mention that some 72 members of Parliament 
(MPs) representing various parties in the Lok Sabha are charged with serious 
crimes including murder, Singh is a veritable saint. Not surprisingly, his poll 
numbers rise sharply when the question of “trustworthiness” and “honesty” 
comes up.2 This is in sharp contrast to his rivals, especially BJP leader Lal 
Krishna Advani. The BJP’s attempt to portray Advani as a gritty loh prush 
(iron man) failed to resonate with the voters. So did its efforts to disparage 
Singh as an unimaginative bureaucrat wholly subservient to the Gandhis and 
to highlight his perceived weakness and indecisiveness in dealing with Paki-
stan after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.3 Voters apparently settled for 
honesty and a conciliatory and steady hand at the helm.
The election results also seemed to defy one of the most widely held as-
sumptions about Indian politics: that political fragmentation and a fractured 
Parliament consisting of unwieldy alliances across a range of parties are the 
wave of the future. It is too early to conclude that this election marks a shift 
in the political landscape with the Congress Party on its way to reclaim its 
once privileged dominant party status. Still, what is clear is that the dispro-
portionate power and influence exercised by several narrow caste, regional, 
and other identity-based parties have been checked for the time being. Polls 
2. Rajdeep Sardesai, “Manmohan Singh: A Natural Born Leader,” Hindustan Times (New 
Delhi), May 17, 2009.
3. Somini Sengupta, “Vote in India Reshapes Landscape,” New York Times, May 18, 2009.
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showed that voters’ increasing frustration and disillusionment with identity-
based parties and politics have translated into votes for the Congress.4
Although the proliferation and ascendance of identity-based parties over 
the past two decades have opened up India’s hitherto closed top-down politi-
cal system to the country’s diverse subaltern communities, these parties’ re-
cord of delivering tangible benefits to their constituencies has been poor. 
Instead, the aspiring leaders of the various caste, regional, and other identity-
based parties have tended to use their parties as vehicles for self-aggrandizement, 
often with impunity.
An illustrative example is Mayawati from the oppressed Dalit (Untouch-
able) caste. She is the current chief minister of the state of Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) and leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party (Majority People’s Party, BSP), 
whose singular mission is to “uplift” the Dalits. An inscrutable and over-
bearing politician, Mayawati has assiduously mobilized Dalit grievances, 
using the message of “respect” and “empowerment” through aggressive af-
firmative action, into electoral success. In the 2007 state assembly elections, 
the BSP won 206 out of 403 seats—the first outright majority in UP in 
nearly two decades. It also increased its aggregate vote share in the state 
from 23% to 30% by garnering not only the bulk of the Dalit vote (Dalits 
comprise roughly 22% of UP’s 175 million residents) but also votes from 
other low-caste Hindus and Muslims. Mayawati, who has made no secret 
of her ambition to be India’s first Dalit prime minister, hoped to repeat her 
party’s stunning performance in 2007 UP state elections in the 2009 na-
tional elections as well. The conventional thinking was that if the BSP could 
win at least 50 of UP’s 80 parliamentary seats, the mercurial Mayawati 
would emerge in a position to bargain with either the emasculated BJP or 
the Congress to become India’s first Dalit prime minister. However, the BSP 
won only 21 seats, whereas the Congress defied all expectations by winning 
22 Lok Sabha seats in the state.5 Exit polls confirmed that both Dalit and 
4. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’ 
Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly 44:39, September 16, 2009, pp. 33–46; 
Emily Wax, “Voters Tell India’s Ruling Party to Persevere,” Washington Post, May 17, 2009. 
5. The last time the Congress Party won an outright majority in UP was in 1984. In 2004, when 
the Congress came to power in the center with 145 parliamentary seats, only nine were from UP. It 
was not expected to do much better in the 2009 elections, but both Sonia and Rahul Gandhi cam-
paigned particularly actively in UP. The Congress Party’s electoral performance in UP winning 22 
was surpassed only by the Samajwadi Party (SP, translated literally as “Socialist Party”), which won 
23 seats. 
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non-Dalit supporters of the BSP, including Muslims, tended to desert the 
party in favor of the Congress.6
This proved fatal for the BSP in some 100 out of 400 state assembly con-
stituencies in UP in which the voting preferences of Muslims prove decisive 
in determining electoral outcomes. Mayawati’s autocratic style of leadership, 
the admitted fact that she has accrued a personal fortune of over $12 million 
during her tumultuous political career, and above all, her government’s all-
around abysmal performance turned off many voters. Similarly, poor perfor-
mances were seen for the BSP’s main electoral rival in UP, the SP and the 
BSP’s rival in the state of Bihar, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (National People’s 
Party, RJD). Both of these habitually masquerade as defenders of the “back-
ward” Yadav caste, but their leaders tend to the irascible, corrupt, and coarse, 
with more than their fair share of criminals running for office. The RJD, in 
fact, was summarily trounced in Bihar.
What explains why the BJP’s spirited attempt to exploit the usual anti-
incumbency sentiment of the Indian voter—from Singh’s “weak” response 
to the Mumbai attacks to his administration’s questionable handling of the 
economic downturn—failed to resonate with the electorate? It seems that 
the government’s quick action in firing its home minister, Shivraj Patel, 
who is responsible for national security, and forcing out the Congress chief 
minister of Maharashtra, Vilasrao Deshmukh, helped assuage the palpable 
public anger over the government’s initial response to the Mumbai attacks. 
Moreover, Singh’s rather calm and measured handling of the post-crisis sce-
nario by deftly mobilizing international diplomatic pressure on Pakistan 
blunted the BJP’s accusation that the Congress’s national-security credentials 
are suspect. As noted earlier, Singh’s clean image stands in stark contrast 
to the self-serving arrogance of India’s traditional elite political class. Accord-
ing to recent polls, Singh is also highly “likable,” thus further enhancing his 
popularity.
In contrast, the BJP’s Achilles’ heel in recent years has been its leadership. 
Unlike the conciliatory former BJP leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was 
able to appeal both to the party’s Hindu nationalist base as well as sections 
of the broader secular public, Advani is the polar opposite. A hard-line 
Hindu nationalist who propelled the BJP to power in the 1990s with his 
6. For details, see data contained on the Election Commission of India (New Delhi, Govern-
ment of India) website, at <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/index.asp> and <http://eci.nic.in/press/
poll_percentage_ge2009>.
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uncompromising demand that a Hindu temple be built on the site of a 
16th-century mosque in the city of Ayodhya, Advani remains enigmatic and 
divisive. Even though he strategically backed away from Hindu chauvinism 
and tried desperately before the elections to shift the national debate to 
economic and security issues, the actions of his surrogates hamstrung the 
BJP from recasting itself as a moderate political party. In particular, Ad-
vani’s perfunctory condemnation of the party’s demagogic maverick Varun 
Gandhi for issuing veiled threats against Muslims raised doubts about Ad-
vani’s sincerity. The prominent campaign role given to the flamboyant and 
unscrupulous chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi (currently barred 
from entering the U.S. because of his alleged complicity in anti-Muslim 
pogroms in Gujarat in 2002) further stained Advani’s image as BJP leader.7 
This not only weakened Advani’s ability to woo back several key coalition 
allies who deserted the BJP after its 2004 defeat, it also unnerved the party’s 
main remaining ally—Nitish Kumar, the chief minister of Bihar and leader 
of the Janata Dal (United). Kumar’s party, which depends heavily on Mus-
lim support in Bihar’s sectarian patchwork of voting districts, demanded 
that Varun Gandhi be prosecuted for making “hate speeches,” and party 
officials avoided appearing alongside Modi during the campaign. The BJP’s 
poor showing underscores that while Hindu nationalism is enough to un-
derpin a political party, it is not enough to form a government in New 
Delhi. This is because Hindus, who comprise over 80% of India’s popula-
tion, do not vote as a unitary bloc. Rather, electoral success in India usually 
depends heavily on a party’s ability to reach out to an array of various 
groups and interests by conveying a political agenda with generalized, as 
opposed to narrow sectoral, appeal.
The biggest losers in this election were the communists and their allies. 
The communists competed for 130 parliamentary seats but won only 20, 
suffering huge losses in their strongholds of West Bengal and Kerala. The 
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) went from being the third larg-
est party in the 2004 Lok Sabha with 43 seats to eighth place with only 16 
seats, below even regional parties like the Trinamool Congress (translated, 
“Grassroots Congress”), the DMK, and the Janata Dal (United). In West 
Bengal, where a communist government has ruled for over 30 years, the 
7. “No Entry for Modi into U.S.: Visa Denied,” Times of India (New Delhi), March 18, 2005. 
For background on Modi’s career, see Robert D. Kaplan, “India’s New Face,” The Atlantic (April 
2009), at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200904>.
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Congress entered into a strategic alliance with the Trinamool Congress, cap-
turing 25 of West Bengal’s 42 parliamentary seats.8 The communists, who 
were a big part of the previous ruling coalition in the center, were relegated 
to the fringes of Parliament in 2009. Exit polls once again suggested that 
widespread cronyism, corruption, and capricious governance—including the 
strong-arm tactics used by CPI-M party cadres to forcibly expropriate land 
from peasants for private industrial development—led to a voter backlash 
against the communists in particular and other leftist parties in general.9
Finally, if the adage that good economics is good politics is true, Man-
mohan Singh was the primary beneficiary because he presided over an un-
precedented economic boom. In the past five years, India’s economy has 
grown at an average annual rate of about 9%, including an impressive 6% 
during the global economic downturn. Adding to Singh’s good fortune was 
the fact that growth has been broad based, in large measure because of four 
good monsoons before 2009 and the global commodity boom that trans-
lated into higher prices for agricultural goods. This meant that the agricul-
tural sector, which accounts for about 18% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employs some 60% of India’s population (nearly 600 million people), 
grew at a robust rate of about 4.5% a year over the past five years. Moreover, 
as if to avoid the error of his BJP predecessor—whose “Shining India” man-
tra glorified the urban information technology sector and overlooked the 
vast rural hinterland—Singh’s government complemented rising rural in-
comes by fully or partly forgiving bank loans owed by “small farmers.” This 
was immensely popular because most Indian peasants are actually small 
landholders. According to the government’s own estimates, the debt writeoff 
for some 43 million farmers in 2008 totaled some 1.6% of GDP. Singh appar-
ently appreciated the fact that the road to achieving political power in New 
Delhi goes through India’s vast countryside.
In an attempt to mitigate the impact of high food prices on the rural poor, 
the Congress government put into place the National Rural Employment 
8. The West Bengal Trinamool Congress, now known as “The All-India Trinamool Congress,” 
was founded by Mamata Banerjee in 1997. It initially consisted of defectors from the INC in West 
Bengal. The party is currently a member of the ruling UPA coalition, and its leader, Mamata Banerjee, 
is the country’s minister for railways.
9. See A. M., “The State of the CPI (M) in West Bengal,” Economic and Political Weekly 44:30, 
July 25, 2009, pp. 8–13; Suhrid Sankar Chattopadhyay, “West Bengal: Left Setback,” Frontline, May 
23-June 5, 2009; and Dipankar Basu, “The Left and the 15th Lok Sabha Elections,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 44:22, May 30, 2009, pp. 10–14.
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Guarantee Act (NREGA), a massive public works project guaranteeing up 
to 100 days’ work with minimum wages and other social and welfare mea-
sures. Both the central and state governments also raised minimum wages, 
thereby raising pay faster than prices. The urban working classes were not 
neglected because the central government generously boosted the pay of 
public employees, and, under the banner of Singh’s “inclusive growth” policy, 
certain constituencies (in particular, civil servants) received benefits at the 
discretion of the government.
THE BROADER MEANING OF vERDICT 2009
With the electoral math decidedly in its favor, there is an expectation that 
the new Congress government will maintain a stable parliamentary majority 
and end the relentless political machinations and policy impasses that have 
plagued India for the past two decades. The fact that caste and regional po-
litical parties (and their mercurial bosses who have come to wield dispropor-
tionate influence) have seen their political power clipped, augurs well for the 
new government. Similarly, the wholesale rejection of the obstructionist left-
ist and communist parties suggests that the voters are not opposed to imple-
mentation of deeper neoliberal economic reforms. It is expected that Singh, 
the quintessential reformer, will finally be able to implement the “second 
generation” economic reforms now that his government is free from the 
entanglements of tired polemic debates and controls the bully pulpit.
This, of course, also means that the Congress will have to deliver on its 
many lofty and expensive promises and will not be able to blame any future 
failures on the vagaries of coalition politics. Singh, who has himself stated 
that the Congress’s victory “comes with a challenge of rising expectations,” is 
certainly cognizant of this. Without a doubt, the two top expectations of the 
Indian population are physical and economic security. The electorate, espe-
cially the urban classes, will be carefully watching how the government over-
hauls the country’s security and strategic systems. Singh has promised to put 
into place a more responsive, effective, and integrated internal security ar-
rangement to make the country safer from unexpected terrorist acts like the 
one that occurred in Mumbai in 2008. This is a tall order because India has 
dismal center-state security coordination, including in the realm of intelli-
gence gathering. Similarly, meeting the economic aspirations and pent-up 
demands of the increasingly aware Indian masses will not be easy, especially 
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when the global economy is reeling under recession and the Indian economy 
faces a ballooning budget deficit, largely as a result of profligate populist 
policies.
The election results also underscore that no party can take the voters for 
granted. The bulk of Indian voters are among the world’s poorest and still 
overwhelmingly illiterate; still, these voters go to the polls in proportionately 
larger numbers than the middle and elite classes.10 They tend to back parties 
that campaign on local issues and represent their particularistic interests and 
sectarian affiliations. Nonetheless, verdict 2009 seems to indicate that voters 
are increasingly impatient with leaders and parties that take their support for 
granted by appealing to their parochial identities while ignoring their mate-
rial needs and physical well-being, once elected. Not surprisingly, large sec-
tions of the electorate rewarded parties seen to be providing good governance 
and economic opportunities. This largely explains why the ruling parties in 
Orissa, Bihar, and Gujarat, with strong economic development records, were 
rewarded at the polls. Egregiously negligent ones—including those in West 
Bengal, Kerala, and UP—were decisively punished. Yet, one should be cau-
tious about reading too much into the election results. The larger picture 
shows that while the Congress Party increased its seats in the Lok Sabha 
from 145 to 206, its total vote share increased by barely 2%—from 26.6% in 
2004 to 28.5% in 2009—far below the more than 40% it routinely used to 
win before the late 1970s. This was in spite of the fact that it contested more 
seats in 2009 than in 2004, 440 compared to 417. The Congress Party’s gains 
were, in fact, mostly restricted to the two most populous states, Bihar and 
UP. In the rest of the country, the Congress’s vote share remained about the 
same. Therefore, it is premature to conclude that the verdict of 2009 indi-
cates a definitive return of its once dominant party status. The results also 
underscore what serious observers of Indian politics have long argued: the 
ideology of Hindutva (literally, “Hinduness”) advocated by the BJP, has only 
limited appeal, and Hindu nationalism is not as potent an existential threat 
to secular India as its critics make it out to be. The BJP’s overall seat tally in 
the Lok Sabha was reduced to 116 in 2009 from 138 in 2004 in spite of the 
10. Emily Wax, “In Elections, Rural India Rules,” Washington Post, April 16, 2009; Sunil Khil-
nani. The Idea of India (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux Publishers, 1997); “India Elections 
Results 2009,” at <http://www.indiaelections.co.in/>; and “Wooing India’s Educated but Apathetic 
Middle-Class Voters,” at <http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/southasia/features/article_
1473771.php>.
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incendiary rhetoric following the Mumbai attacks. Its total vote share also 
decreased nationally from 22.2% to 18.8%. Also, the election may not signal 
a definitive trend toward the permanent weakening of regional parties. 
Some, such as the RJD; the Lok Janshakti Party (translated, People’s Power 
Party); and the Janata Dal (Secular) (People’s Party [Secular]), certainly saw 
their support decrease in their traditional strongholds in Bihar, Karnataka, 
and Kerala. But others like the Biju Janata Dal (BJD, Biju’s People Party) 
made significant gains in Orissa.11 Moreover, the elections may not necessar-
ily mean the permanent decline of identity-based parties. In fact, the total 
votes polled by a number of identity-based parties actually increased, even 
though their seat count in the Lok Sabha may have decreased. The BSP, for 
example, increased its vote share from 5.3% in 2004 to 6.2% in 2009. It 
seems that the old saying, “the more things change, the more they remain 
the same,” fits contemporary Indian politics as well.
A RESIL IENT ECONOMY AMID GLOBAL TuRMOIL
As noted, India has enjoyed robust 9% per annum growth rates since 2004, 
peaking at 9.7% in 2006–07, the highest in its history and almost on par with 
China’s. Even in the midst of the global financial meltdown, India’s GDP grew 
by 5.8% in the first two quarters of 2009, allowing it to weather the downturn 
better than most other countries.12 However, growth rates are only part of the 
explanation. According to Arvind Subramanian, India’s peculiar approach—
what he terms “Goldilocks globalization,” a strategy that “relies neither too 
much on foreign finance nor too much on exports”—explains the country’s 
economic resilience in an unprecedented global crisis. Subramanian notes that 
because “India has not been a gung-ho globalizer,” the two channels via which 
a financial crisis is transmitted—finance and trade—have had only modest 
impacts.13 India has greater immunity to global economic downturns because 
11. The BJD was founded in 1997 by the former state chief minister of Orissa, Biju Patnaik—
hence its name. It is currently led by his son, Naveen Patnaik.
12. For details, see Shalendra D. Sharma, “Dealing with the Contagion: China and India in the 
aftermath of the Subprime Meltdown,” China and the World Economy 17:2 (March-April 2009), pp. 
1–14; and idem, “A Political Economy of the U.S. Subprime Meltdown,” Economic Analysis and 
Policy 39:2 (September 2009), pp. 171–90.
13. Arvind Subramanian, “India’s Goldilocks Globalization,” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics (Washington, D.C.), June 15, 2009, at <http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.
cfm?ResearchID=1238>. 
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it relies heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than securities in-
vestment and other forms of capital flows to access international capital mar-
kets. The fact that the rupee is not fully convertible (and is hardly used outside 
India) has created a buffer as well.
On the other hand, countries that depend heavily on capital inflows or bor-
row large amounts of foreign capital experienced major disruptions to their 
exchange rates, asset prices, and financial systems because capital inflows 
stopped or “fled to safety.” Furthermore, unlike export-dependent countries 
that suffered as a result of the collapse in external demand, India’s growth has 
been driven predominantly by domestic consumption and investment. Exter-
nal demand, as measured by merchandise exports, accounts for less than 15% 
of India’s GDP, providing relative insulation from the vagaries of global trade. 
Finally, unlike the 1991 crisis, India currently has healthy cash reserves that are 
more than adequate to cover its debt obligations. Cumulatively, these strengths 
served to calm markets and mitigate a potentially destructive financial panic.
However, at the heart of India’s economic resilience lies the fact that its 
financial sector was not exposed to American sub-prime mortgage securities. 
Clearly, the conservative approach adopted by India’s central bank, the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI), kept the banking sector “protected” from the global 
financial markets. Indian banks, some of which are quite large by global 
standards, based on market capitalization and the size of their balance sheets, 
have only a modest international presence. This is because credit default 
swaps were not permitted in the country, and the use of “toxic” securitized 
assets was actively discouraged. In addition, RBI rules helped force both 
public and private banks to become better capitalized. The capital-to-risk 
weighted assets ratio of Indian banks is 12.6%, well above both the regulatory 
norm of 9% and the Basel Accord norm of 8%.14 Finally, the banking sector 
was protected because India’s state-owned banks still hold about 70% of the 
nation’s banking assets. Thus, financial protectionism has ironically (and in-
advertently) translated into foreign banks controlling a relatively small share 
(8.4%) of the country’s banking assets. Moreover, foreign banks could not 
flee with their assets, as they did elsewhere during this crisis.
Yet, as Subramanian aptly notes, India’s “Goldilocks globalization” has 
come with high costs in other respects. In particular, he says, “India never 
14. The Basel Accords are banking supervision accords designed to establish international stan-
dards on banking laws and regulations.
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enjoyed the kind of benefits—such as greater efficiency and productivity 
leading to even higher growth—that comes with deeper reforms.”15 There 
was much expectation that with the election victory behind him, Singh 
would use the honeymoon period of the first hundred days to fast-track 
long-delayed reforms including labor market reforms, disinvestment (which 
in India means partial privatization via selling stakes in government enter-
prises), and sharp cuts in subsidies, among other things. Yet, none of these 
found their way into the government’s July 2009 budget. Rather, the au-
thorities have explained their caution by pointing to concerns about the 
central government’s growing budget deficit.
One widespread view is that both Sonia and Rahul Gandhi, who hold 
virtual veto power over the future direction of government policies, prefer 
populist policies such as NREGA rather than implementing deeper eco-
nomic reforms. It remains to be seen if Singh can convince the Gandhis that 
populist measures have only short-term benefits with potential overriding 
long-term consequences. Robust growth is essential not only to fund the 
government’s pro-poor policies but also for long-term economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. It could be a potential missed opportunity for India if 
the Singh government succumbs to the exigencies of populism and fails to 
put in place the “second-generation” neoliberal economic reforms. Until 
meaningful reforms are implemented, the cliché will be confirmed that “in 
Indian politics, there is only a strong consensus for weak reforms.”
In 2009, India experienced its worst monsoon season in decades. The 
monsoon rains, which fall mostly between June and September and consti-
tute 75%–80% of the country’s annual rainfall—were far below average, leav-
ing vast swaths of the Gangetic Plains parched. Because the monsoon rains 
coincide with the peak planting season, the negative impact on the agricul-
tural sector is already being felt. Not only are hundred of thousands of acres 
lying fallow, even the sown areas are at risk of withering as water levels in 
wells and reservoirs fall precipitously to compensate for the water shortfall. 
Although India has sufficient food reserves to mitigate inflation, and the 
central government has announced plans to assist farmers, this may not be 
enough to save many of the impoverished smallholder peasants from finan-
cial ruin and possible destitution. A poor monsoon also means a sharp drop 
in power production: hydropower provides one-quarter of India’s electricity. 
15. Subramanian, “India’s Goldilocks Globalization.” 
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The lack of reliable energy supplies has already hurt GDP growth, and im-
paired production in 2009 could stymie it further. For example, a mediocre 
monsoon season in 2002 slowed GDP growth that year by two full percent-
age points, from 5.8% to 3.8%.
INDO-u.S .  RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF OBAMA
The widespread perception in India that the Obama administration has not 
given the country the attention it deserves is not without merit. President 
Barack Obama’s remark that “you should not pay lower taxes if you create a 
job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York” raised 
eyebrows in New Delhi, as did the president’s signing a joint communiqué 
with Chinese President Hu Jintao pledging the two countries to jointly pro-
mote stability in South Asia. To New Delhi, this was tantamount to “tilting” 
and legitimizing China’s “destabilizing” role on the subcontinent.16
New Delhi is cognizant that it may be unreasonable to expect Obama to 
match his immediate predecessor’s strong commitment to Indo-U.S. rela-
tions. (President George W. Bush had, in fact, made ties with India one of 
the cornerstones of his foreign policy.) Yet, there is serious concern that a 
lack of meaningful engagement could potentially sidetrack the recent gains 
both sides have made in their bilateral relations. During her visit to India in 
July, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apparently tried to make amends by 
profusely praising India’s political and economic achievements. Yet, she also 
made it clear that the U.S. expects India to become a more engaged global 
stakeholder in fighting terrorism, supporting multilateral efforts in conclud-
ing the Doha Round, combating climate change, and pressing for nuclear 
non-proliferation. If the Obama administration wants India to cooperate, it 
will first have to deal with many of India’s lingering requests, including final-
izing a number of important initiatives left over from the Bush administra-
tion such as bilateral defense and civilian space agreements.
However, cooperation on some of these issues will not be easy. New Delhi 
knows well that then-Senator Obama was one of the staunchest opponents of 
the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and that now-President Obama is deeply commit-
ted to nuclear non-proliferation. It will create much bilateral tension if Obama 
presses ahead to try to bring holdouts (e.g., India, Israel, and Pakistan) into the 
16. “Obama Ends Tax Sops to Outsourcing Firms,” The Hindu, May 6, 2009, at <http://www.
thehindu.com/2009/05/06/stories/2009050650060100.htm>.
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Control Treaty 
(FMCT), and above all into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
framework. New Delhi has repeatedly stated that it will not be a party to the 
NPT and CTBT unless the security environment in Asia improves.
Similarly, Obama, who is a strong proponent of the Kyoto agreement on 
climate change, has served notice that he expects India and other emerging 
economies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, even though they may 
have been exempted by the initial protocol. Secretary Clinton’s call that 
India must assume greater responsibility by accepting some caps on its emis-
sions received a rather sharp reply from Jairam Ramesh, a senior Indian 
government minister. Ramesh berated Clinton, stating that given India’s al-
ready low per capita emissions, the legally binding emissions targets were 
“unfair” and would undermine the country’s economic growth. He reiterated 
the Indian government’s long-standing position that rich nations must first 
finance the import of expensive green technologies to help less-developed 
nations reduce emissions.
Privately, India is also deeply concerned about growing protectionism in 
the U.S. and has formally noted that the recent “cap and tax” bill passed by the 
U.S. Congress is punitive because its places tariffs on goods from countries 
that do not follow America’s “unfair” emissions targets. Yet, both countries 
are now part of the G-20 and despite their differences must work together 
for the common good. Indeed, the Obama administration has a natural ally 
in India, provided that it treats India as an equal partner. After all, both 
countries share common security concerns including the fight against global 
terrorism, preventing the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, encouraging 
a stable Pakistan, and limiting Chinese influence in Southern Asia.
Perhaps to show New Delhi that the U.S. values its relations with India, 
President Obama gave Prime Minister Singh a red carpet welcome during 
Singh’s official visit to the U.S. in the third week of November, complete 
with a 21-gun salute and the first state dinner at the White House. This re-
spectful reception helped ameliorate some Indian concerns, but India still 
remembers that, although New Delhi and Washington enjoyed a warm rela-
tionship during Bill Clinton’s presidency, it did not translate into major 
substantive agreements. (President Clinton, in fact, also hosted then Indian 
Prime Minister Atal BihariVajpayee to a state dinner at the White House.) 
Obama and Singh failed to make significant progress on the completion of 
the nuclear-energy cooperation agreement approved by both countries’ 
AS5001_13_India-Sharma.indd   153 2/11/10   9:24 AM
This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 13:45:15 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
154  • ASIAN SuRvEY 50:1
legislatures in 2008, but they did outline an extensive list of joint U.S.-India 
initiatives to enhance trade, education, and military ties. The latter included 
cooperation to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, a commitment to put 
a moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing, and a global treaty proposal to 
ban the production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel. It remains to be seen if 
Obama can successfully pick up where President George W. Bush left off and 
use his considerable political skills to further deepen U.S.-India relations.
INDIA’S  RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA
In his most forceful speech on the topic, Prime Minister Singh stated on 
January 6, 2009, that Pakistani authorities “must have had” a hand in the 
November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. While Singh stopped just short 
of accusing Islamabad of directly aiding the Pakistan-based militant group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), he was explicit in alleging Paki-
stani complicity by noting that “there is enough evidence to show that, 
given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have 
had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.”17 Singh further criti-
cized Islamabad’s reluctance to crack down on terrorists operating “freely” 
in its territory and its “inexcusable” failure to have never brought any of 
the perpetrators to justice. For these reasons, he demanded that Pakistan 
hand over the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to India where they 
would face justice.
Pakistan’s prevarication and failure to hold the perpetrators accountable 
not only further strained the already tense relations between the two nuclear-
armed neighbors, but it also brought an abrupt end to discussion of all sub-
stantive issues that divided the two countries, as New Delhi suspended all 
dialogue with Islamabad. Eventually, Pakistan’s belated pledge to bring the 
perpetrators to justice seemed “halfway” enough for Singh to meet with his 
Pakistani counterpart, Yousaf Raza Gilani, during the Non-Aligned Move-
ment summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, in July 2009. Beyond all 
expectations, both countries agreed in a joint statement to cooperate in 
fighting terrorism, sharing real-time intelligence on terrorist threats, and at-
tempting to resolve their differences peacefully. Given that the two countries 
had come close to war in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the joint 
17. “Isolate Pakistan for Using Terrorism as State Policy: PM,” ibid., January 6, 2009, at <http://
www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901061505.htm>.
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statement clearly “represented a . . . not insignificant breakthrough.”18 Yet, 
the resumption of substantive dialogue between the two neighbors will de-
pend much on Pakistan reining-in the extremist and terrorist groups operat-
ing within its territory and, in particular, prosecuting those responsible for 
the Mumbai attacks. The Indian public is still deeply traumatized and seeth-
ing with anger over the brutal murder of 160 innocents during the Mumbai 
carnage. However, Pakistan has yet to translate words into deeds.
Given the unprecedented extent of high-level interaction between New 
Delhi and Beijing in recent years, relations between India and China have 
actually remained surprisingly acrimonious. Trade friction between India 
and China has intensified even though Asia’s two fastest growing economies 
enjoy robust bilateral trade—about $52 billion in 2009 with the goal to 
achieve $60 billion in 2010. China is, in fact, India’s biggest trading partner, 
but India has, nonetheless, filed a number of anti-dumping cases against 
China via the World Trade Organization (WTO), in addition to banning the 
import of many Chinese toys and food products on safety grounds.
However, it has been lingering territorial disputes in Arunachal Pradesh 
and Aksai Chin that have been the main sources of acrimony in bilateral 
relations. It seems that China took the planned visit by the exiled Dalai 
Lama to Arunachal Pradesh, in particular to Tawang (birth place of the re-
vered Sixth Dalai Lama that lies within the borders claimed by both India 
and China), as deliberate provocation. Since the summer, incursions by 
China’s troops into Indian-controlled territory have increased and, in Octo-
ber, Beijing went so far as objecting to a visit by Prime Minister Singh to 
Arunachal Pradesh to campaign for local elections, stating that “we request 
India to pay great attention to China’s solemn concerns, and not stir up in-
cidents in the areas of dispute.”19
New Delhi sternly countered back, asserting that Arunachal Pradesh is an 
integral part of India, and demanded that China stop meddling in India’s 
domestic affairs. (The Chinese embassy was apparently issuing visas for resi-
dents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir on separate pieces of 
paper instead of on their Indian passports, suggesting that these states were 
not part of India.) At a summit of Asian leaders in Thailand in late October, 
18. Lydia Polgreen, “India and Pakistan Agree to Fight Terror Together,” New York Times, July 
17, 2009.
19. Peter Wonacott, “China, India Stoke 21st-Century Rivalry,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 
2009, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125625173429702481.html>.
AS5001_13_India-Sharma.indd   155 2/11/10   9:24 AM
This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 13:45:15 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
156  • ASIAN SuRvEY 50:1
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Manmohan Singh agreed to resolve their 
differences with “understanding and trust.” Yet, border incidents, especially 
Chinese cross-border incursions, have continued unabated as recently as 
mid-December. It seems that India and China may be destined to be rivals. 
After all, as an old Chinese proverb says, “Two tigers cannot share the same 
mountain.”
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